OSS Jump Instructors Near Kunming, in David W. Hogan, Jr.'s Special Ops Book; Albert Wedemeyer

U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II is an online book, in which Chapter 5 deals with Special Operations in CBI Theater.

Below is an excerpt from pages 124-126, in Chapter 5 (emphasis mine):

 "The establishment of an independent OSS branch in China and the end of the war in Europe in early 1945 greatly facilitated the expansion of OSS operations. After assuming command of the new China Theater in October 1944, Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer pushed hard for control over all U.S. clandestine operations in China. His arguments before the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Donovan's constant complaints to President Roosevelt of Chinese obstructionism finally resulted in the creation of an OSS agency independent of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization and under Wedemeyer's control. Meanwhile, the end of the war in Europe enabled the OSS to shift materiel, supplies, and personnel, including trained operational groups, to the Far East. By the summer of 1945 four-man OSS teams were training and leading large groups of Chinese partisans in operations against Japanese communications in southern China.39

Even before the end of the war in Europe, OSS personnel had been attempting to organize Chinese commando forces for operations behind enemy lines. The idea apparently drew its inspiration from Wedemeyer, who, as a staff officer, had been involved in the formation of Darby's Rangers. Given the generally deplorable performance of Chiang's regular army in the field, the American theater commander hoped that smaller Chinese units, with intensive American training and guidance, might fight more effectively than the standard Chinese divisions. After some opposition, Chiang's government grudgingly agreed in February 1945 to provide about 4,000 troops, food, clothing, and equipment for a force of twenty commando units. Almost immediately, the project encountered problems. The Chinese soldiers failed to arrive at the training area in Kunming until mid-April, and the quality of those who finally came varied greatly. Not surprisingly, Chiang's generals gave little support to the effort. Nevertheless, with the Office of Strategic Services in China providing most of the supplies and equipment, the OSS instructors began a hurried eight-week course in weapons training, guerrilla tactics, and parachuting. By July three commando units, each containing about 150 Chinese and 20 American advisers, were ready for the field.40

On balance, the program was a success but came too late in the war to have much of an impact. Under the operational control of the Chinese military command, the commandos were to attack communications, to capture significant operational objectives, to gather intelligence, and to protect key facilities from destruction by retreating Japanese forces. Although the commandos later suffered severe losses in the field, they exhibited a fighting spirit rare in the other Nationalist combat units, but lack of coordination and their subsequent misuse as line infantry were major problems. For example, during an assault by three commando units and the Chinese 265th Regiment on Tanchuk airfield, the OSS-trained forces seized high ground overlooking the airfield but took heavy casualties and were forced to withdraw when the 265th failed to arrive in time to support them. An attack on Taiyuanshih by another commando unit and local guerrillas also failed for similar reasons. Nevertheless, by the time the Japanese finally surrendered in August 1945, the commandos appeared to have become an effective fighting force. The Chinese Nationalist high command, however, continued to mistrust these American-inspired units and showed little grasp of their proper employment.41"

Citations:

"39. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 364, 417-18, 440-47; Miles, A Different Kind of War, pp. 433-41, 455, 476; Smith, OSS, p. 266; Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: Holt, 1958), pp. 252-53, 271. 

40. Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2: 417, 443, 454-55; see OSS/China monthly reports in OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Boxes 65-66, RG 226, NARA; Memorandum of Information to the JCS, 10 Aug 45, OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 68, Folder 218, RG 226, NARA.

41. Operational group monthly reports and the Nanking Mission in Folders 207 and 208, OSS Activities China, 11 Jun 45, and Memorandum of Information for the JCS, 30 Aug 45, Sub: OSS Special Operations in China, Folder 211, all in OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Boxes 65-66, RG 226, NARA."

The photo below is linked within page 125, Chapter 5:

Officers and men of the OSS who instructed Chinese commandos in parachute jumping and commando tactics at the commando training camp in Kunming, China (U.S. Army photograph)

Fourth row, standing, second from the right:  Eugene Zdrojewski.
(My identification.)

Second row, seated, second from left:  Is this Frenchie?
Edit: Yes.

Third row, standing, fourth from left.

First row, seated, third from left.
This looks like Ralph Sebastian
from A.S.T.P. Chicago days.

General Albert Coady Wedemeyer pushed the Joint Chiefs
to get OSS in CBI out of the SACO.
(Widipedia photo.)

Wedemeyer on the Ledo Road.
(Source: LedoRoad site.)

Nebraska boy in China.
(Source: Romanus & Sunderland.)